Can an Illinois appellate court appoint counsel over a defendant’s objection?

The Second District held on August 7, 2026 that it can, reasoning that the appellant repeatedly requested counsel, that his indigency was established by his fee-waiver application, and that a defendant has no constitutional right to self-representation on appeal under Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California. The separate question raised by the July 31 order is not the appointment but the two restraints in its second sentence, which no party requested and which the order supports with no citation.

The Order That Told a Man He May File Nothing Further

Q: What is the July 31 filing restriction in Appeal No. 2-26-0352?

It is the second sentence of the order entered July 31, 2026: "Now having been appointed counsel, appellant himself shall file nothing further with this court and shall not communicate by any means with appellee’s counsel." No party moved for it, no hearing was held, and the order cites no authority for it.

What the Record Establishes

The order is a public instrument of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, entered July 31, 2026 in No. 2-26-0352, and it is reproduced whole on this page.
The first sentence grants relief the appellant asked for. The second sentence imposes two restraints nobody asked for.
The order cites no rule, no statute and no decision for either restraint, and does not describe them as sanctions.
The People’s objection of July 30 asked in paragraph 13 that the appellant "be barred from further supplement." No motion was filed, no notice issued, and no hearing was held on that request.

What They Have Not Produced

Any order, before or since, that identifies the authority for a filing bar entered on no motion.
Any finding of fact supporting a restraint on a litigant’s access to a reviewing court.
Any ruling on the scope of the second sentence — whether it reaches service, FOIA requests, or a disciplinary referral — which has now been left standing twice and examined zero times.

Read the order before anything is said about it. This is the entire operative text, as entered.

Appellant’s “omnibus emergency motion” is granted as to its request for the appointment of appellate counsel, and the Office of the State Appellate Defender is hereby appointed. Now having been appointed counsel, appellant himself shall file nothing further with this court and shall not communicate by any means with appellee’s counsel. Appellant’s “omnibus” motion, and his other pending motions, are otherwise denied without prejudice to any motion filed by his counsel, including a motion to stay. (Appellant’s counsel is hereby advised of appellant’s suggestion that his jail term will begin on August 6, 2026.) This court reserves any issue of its jurisdiction.
Order, People v. Allababidi, No. 2-26-0352 (Ill. App. Ct., 2d Dist., July 31, 2026)

The two sentences do different things, and only one of them was asked for

On July 28, 2026 the appellant filed an omnibus emergency motion. So far as it touched counsel, it asked the court to make an indigency determination under Rule 607(a) and to appoint appellate counsel on that finding. It asked for nothing else about counsel. It asked for no restriction on anyone.

The first sentence of the July 31 order grants that request. The second sentence imposes two restraints: a bar on filing, and a bar on communicating with opposing counsel by any means. No party moved for either. No notice of either issued. No hearing was held. No finding was made. The order cites no rule, no statute and no decision for either one, and it does not call them sanctions. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375, which governs sanctions in a reviewing court, is not mentioned.

The restraint that cannot examine itself

A restriction on a litigant’s access to a reviewing court cannot be self-insulating. A motion asking whether the movant may be heard cannot be answered by the proposition that he may not. That is the structural problem the July 31 order creates, and it is why the August 14 motion in the Second District requests leave under Rule 361(a) in the alternative, on the face of page one, rather than pretending the bar is not there.

The bar collides with the court’s own local rules

Second District Local Rule 102(b) requires a party to confer with opposing counsel before filing any motion and to state the result in the motion. Local Rule 109(b) requires the movant on an emergency motion to serve it on every other party electronically. The July 31 order forbids communication with appellee’s counsel by any means. Selecting opposing counsel for electronic service is an act of communication by the person who selects them; the motion filed August 14 says so in terms rather than claiming a workaround.

The consequence is arithmetic, not argument: every motion the appellant files in this appeal is defective under Local Rule 102(b) for a reason created by an order of the court, and the defect is not curable by him. The August 14 motion therefore asks, as a threshold matter and before anything else is reached, to be told the mechanism by which service is to be accomplished — not to be relieved of service.

What happened when the bar met a real emergency

On August 13, 2026, at approximately 3:00 p.m., officers came to the appellant’s residence on the warrant issued May 28, 2026. The custodial term challenged in this appeal is unstayed. The court’s own July 31 order named the remedy — “without prejudice to any motion filed by his counsel, including a motion to stay” — and no stay has been filed. The doorstep record is here.

What this page does not say

It does not say the panel acted in bad faith, and it makes no allegation about any judge’s state of mind. It states what the order says, what the appellant asked for, and what the record shows nobody asked for. Those three facts are on the face of court instruments, and every one of them is reproduced in the supporting record filed under Rule 328.